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A Cure for Discrimination? Affirmative Action 
and the Case of California Proposition 209
∗
 
Proposition 209, enacted in California in 1996 and made effective the following year, ended 
state affirmative action programs not only in education, but also for public employment and 
government contracting. This paper uses CPS data and triple difference techniques to take 
advantage of the natural experiment presented by this change in state law to gauge the labor 
market impacts of ending affirmative action programs. Employment among women and 
minorities dropped sharply, a change that was nearly completely explained by a decline in 
participation rather than by increases in unemployment. This decline suggests that either 
affirmative action programs in California had been inefficient or that they failed to create 
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 1 Introduction
Introducing and removing a±rmative action are not opposite sides of the same
coin. Proponents of a±rmative action maintain that it will provide a long-term
cure for discrimination by allowing victims to demonstrate their skill and worth,
thus changing prejudicial attitudes. Under this scenario, if a±rmative action
\works," then when it is time to get rid of the program there will be no deleteri-
ous e®ects for minorities. Opponents of these controversial programs, however,
argue that it does not address the root source of inequality and, moreover, that
it may create labor market ine±ciencies and result in reverse discrimination
against white males. Both sides, therefore, suggest that an e®ective a±rmative
action program would cause minority employment to rise, but they disagree on
whether this increase is e±cient and whether it would be sustainable if formal
a±rmative action were ended.
To date, there has been little opportunity to measure the impact of removing
a±rmative action programs. While federal support for enforcement has ebbed
and °owed and Supreme Court rulings in the past decade have chipped away at
a±rmative action, it is di±cult to say whether concurrent changes in minority
outcomes were due to a±rmative action policy or other trends in inequality.
A similar problem plagued attempts to measure the impact of instituting af-
¯rmative action in earlier years. While minorities and women made gains in
the labor market in the seventies and eighties, it is not clear what portion of
this was due to a±rmative action and what was the result of other in°uences.
Empirical studies of the impact of a±rmative action on labor markets have re-
lied on di®erences in outcomes for government contractors, who are subject to
the program, and non-contractors, who are not. While these studies have pro-
vided evidence of minority gains among contracting ¯rms, the results could be
biased because contractor status is not exogenous: ¯rms with the lowest cost of
1meeting a±rmative actions requirements may be more likely to be contractors.
Hence, we are left with an incomplete picture of both the impact of a contro-
versial program and the potential consequences of its removal. What is needed,
essentially, is a control group to which we can compare changes in outcomes for
those a®ected by a±rmative action.
The enactment of California Proposition 209 provides just such an oppor-
tunity. The measure, passed in the 1996 state elections and made e®ective in
November of 1997, essentially outlawed existing local and state a±rmative ac-
tion programs in education, public hiring, and contracting, unless superseded
by federal law. This change in state policy presents a natural experiment for
measuring the labor market impact of removing of a±rmative action programs.
I use Current Population Survey (CPS) data to compare outcomes for minori-
ties in California before and after a±rmative action was removed to those same
outcomes for white males. Then, to control for national trends in minority dif-
ferentials, I compare this di®erence to the di®erence for a control group: states
not undergoing similar changes in the law. The use of this triple di®erence
technique to analyze the impact of removing a±rmative action on employment,
unemployment, labor force participation, and wages will provide evidence on
the long-term e®ects of a±rmative action.
2 The history and consequences of a±rmative
action policy
National legislation and impacts
Whereas equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act prohibit discrimination, a±rmative action legislation goes fur-
ther by requiring that proactive steps be undertaken to remedy inequalities
produced by past discrimination. In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive
2Order 11246, the primary regulation governing a±rmative action, which requires
that federal contractors \take a±rmative action to ensure that applicants are
employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard
to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Under its provisions, fed-
eral contractors must provide written a±rmative action plans, progress reports,
and submit to government compliance reviews. While EO 11246 only directly
a®ected federal contractors, many state and local agencies and non-contractor
private businesses voluntarily adopted similar programs in an attempt to ad-
dress discrimination and avoid litigation under equal employment laws (Thomas
and Garrett, 1999).
Early studies tend to indicate that a±rmative action had a positive impact
on the employment and occupational advancement of racial minorities.1 Be-
cause of the inherent di±culty in separating gains from a±rmative action from
general trends in racial inequality, these studies rely on data from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to compare outcomes for ¯rms
that are federal contractors, and hence subject to federal a±rmative action pro-
grams, with ¯rms that are not. Ashenfelter and Heckman (1976) ¯nd that the
demand for black males increased 3.3 percent more among contractors than
non-contractors between 1966 and 1970. While they ¯nd similar employment
gains for black males during the early seventies, Heckman and Wolpin (1976)
and Goldstein and Smith (1976) ¯nd no improvement or even declines in em-
ployment for females at contractor establishments. However, as Leonard (1989)
points out, a±rmative action for women did not become stringently enforced
until after the Equal Employment Act of 1972.
Studies of a±rmative action in the late seventies and beyond tended again
to ¯nd positive employment gains for racial minorities and additional, although
smaller, gains for white females. Leonard (1984c) ¯nds that between 1974 and
1For a survey of the literature on a±rmative action, see Holzer and Neumark (2000a).
31980, contractor demand for black males grew 3.8 percent faster, demand for
other minority males grew 7.9 percent faster, and the demand for white females
grew 2.8 percent faster than that of non-contractors. Leonard (1984b) also
¯nds that a±rmative action appeared to have a relatively greater impact on
minorities in skilled occupational groups, although Smith and Welch (1984)
suggest that observed gains in occupational status may be due to contractors
re-classifying jobs rather than to any real upward mobility. Rodgers and Spriggs
(1996) ¯nd that the positive impact on employment continued through to 1992
for all groups except Hispanics, for whom they ¯nd a negative impact. Holzer
and Neumark (2000b) have one of the few empirical studies with wide scope that
does not depend on EEOC data. Using information from a survey of employers
in four U.S. cities, they ¯nd that ¯rms that use a±rmative action do tend to
recruit and hire more minorities and women. In fact, contrary to most earlier
results, the use of a±rmative action in hiring seems to have the largest e®ect
for white women. For ¯rms that report using a±rmative action in hiring, the
last employee hired is 8 percent more likely to be a white woman and 3 percent
more likely to be a black man.
Bene¯ts through employment gains and occupational advance, however, may
mask underlying losses in e±ciency. While the e®ects of a±rmative action on
market e±ciency are not fully understood,2 what evidence is present does not
seem to suggest large declines in productivity. Leonard (1984a) combines EEOC
data with industry level data and ¯nds no evidence of lower productivity among
federal contractors. In their study, Holzer and Neumark (2000b) ¯nd that while
minorities and women hired under a±rmative action appear to have lower read-
ily observable quali¯cations, their employers do not report signi¯cantly lower
performance for these groups than for white males. The authors suggest that
this is the result of more intensive screening and training programs.
2Holzer and Neumark (2000a) suggest that this is an important area for future research
4California legislation and impacts
While empirical studies have tended to focus on national legislation, state gov-
ernments have also instituted equal employment laws and a±rmative action
programs. In 1959, ¯ve years before the passage of the federal Civil Rights Act,
California passed the Fair Employment Practices Act, which outlawed discrim-
ination in that state and created the Fair Employment Practices Commission
(FEPC) (later given responsibility for housing as well and re-named the Fair
Employment and Housing Commission) to enforce the act. The FEPC was
also granted the power to \engage in a±rmative action with owners" in or-
der to remedy discrimination (State of California). In practice, the FEPC has
been responsible for oversight of a±rmative action plans for state contracts over
$200,000. In addition, in 1974 California began requiring all public agencies to
submit a±rmative action reports to the State Personnel Board (SPB), which
was responsible for the oversight and development of public a±rmative action
programs(Thomas and Garrett, 1999). In 1989 California established contract-
ing set asides for minority and women-owned business, requiring that at least
15 percent of the total value of state contracts go to minority-owned businesses
and 5 percent to women- owned businesses. So, prior to 1997, not only were
federal employers and contractors in California subject to mandated a±rmative
action programs, but so were all public employees and state contractors.
However, attacks on these state programs in the mid 1990's have resulted in
their formal dismantling. In 1995, then-governor Pete Wilson signed Executive
Order 124-95, which directed state agencies to eliminate preferential treatments
that exceed federal or state statutory requirements. Legally this could only
apply to pre-standing executive orders, and thus should not have a®ected state
a±rmative action laws, but it is not clear, in practice, what e®ect it would have
(Thomas and Garrett, 1999). A year later, California voters passed Proposition
209 outlawing all state a±rmative action programs and hence releasing public
5employers as well as state contractors from a±rmative action requirements.
After lengthy court challenges, the new law went into e®ect in November, 1997.
While there has been a °urry of research on the impacts of Propositon 209
on higher education in California, economists have neglected to pay attention
to the corresponding impacts on labor markets. Yet, given that 8 percent of
California's work force is in the non-federal public sector3 and nearly 15 percent
of California small businesses claim California state and local governments as
clients (Williams, 1999), we might expect Proposition 209 to a®ect more than
educational institutions. On the other hand, Holzer and Neumark (1999) suggest
that approximately 60 percent of ¯rms are federal contractors and subject to
federal a±rmative action policy. So, while Proposition 209 is likely to have had
an e®ect on public employers in California, it may have been considerably less
binding on private ¯rms that are still subject to federal law.
The Proposition 209 experiment
Not only does it seem reasonable to expect that this change in policy would
have an impact on California labor markets, but it also provides an opportunity
to address two shortcomings of the empirical evidence to date.
First, previous work has had to rely on the comparison of ¯rms that partic-
ipate in a±rmative action to those that do not. Researchers have either used
EEOC data to compare federal contractors to non-contractors or ¯rm-level data
to compare ¯rms that report using a±rmative action to those that do not. Yet,
because ¯rms self-select into using a±rmative action (by choosing to be federal
contractors or by voluntarily implementing their own programs), estimates of
the impact of a±rmative action may be biased downward. Federal contrac-
tors and voluntary participants may self-select precisely because it is relatively
cheap to implement a±rmative action. Moreover, the results of these studies
3This average is from the employment data used in this paper.
6have only provided an indication of the ¯rm or sector-level impact of a±rmative
action, not of its economy-wide impacts. For instance, it is known that minor-
ity employment was rising at both contracting and non-contracting ¯rms that
¯le EEO-1 reports (albeit more rapidly at the contracting ¯rms), but what was
happening at ¯rms that do not have to provide data on their composition? Did
this rise in employment mask a re-shu²ing of minorities between sectors?
Second, there has been no previous opportunity to gauge the impact of re-
moving a±rmative action| only of implementing it. While we do not su®er
from a shortage of theoretical models of a±rmative action, there is compara-
tively scant evidence on its long-term consequences. Theoretically, any model
of a binding and e®ective a±rmative action program will predict that minority
employment should rise while the policy is in place, leaving only the need to
see empirically whether existing programs appear to be e®ective and what the
extent of their impact is.
Depending on the assumptions made about the source of pre-existing in-
equality, a±rmative action may or may not engender a long-term change in
labor market di®erentials that would remain even if the program were removed.
If labor market discrimination did not exist in the ¯rst place or if, as some mod-
els (e.g., Johnson and Welch, 1976) suggest, a±rmative action is not an e±cient
policy, then removing a±rmative action may cause the labor market to revert
to its competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, certain models of discrimina-
tion do suggest a long-term impact for a±rmative action. If, for example, labor
market inequalities are the result of classic employer discrimination, then it is
possible that by being forced to interact with minority groups, employer preju-
dices will diminish so that once a±rmative action is removed there is no longer
inequality. Alternatively, Coate and Loury (1993) consider a form of statistical
discrimination in which employers are less likely to place minority workers in
high skilled jobs because of negative stereotypes. As a result, minorities have
7less incentive to invest in human capital, leading to a self-ful¯lling prophecy.
Assuming that minority workers have the same fundamental ability, a±rmative
action could break this cycle and potentially create permanent change in neg-
ative stereotypes. A third theoretical alternative for predicting the continued
e®ectiveness of a±rmative action after its removal is that presented by Athey
et al. (2000). In their model, entry level employees receive more mentoring
from senior employees with similar characteristics. As a result, there is bias
towards one type of employee in promotion that can be permanently broken by
a temporary a±rmative action program that introduces diversity.
The passage of Proposition 209 provides a natural experiment that can be
used to address both shortcomings of previous studies. First, it provides a (pre-
sumably) exogenous shock to a±rmative action policy that a®ects only workers
in California, leaving workers in the rest of the country as a control group.
Second, this is the ¯rst legislation that has attempted to dismantle a±rmative
action.4 By comparing the relative change in labor market outcomes in Califor-
nia to the rest of the country, we can see what impact removing state-sponsored
a±rmative action had on women and minorities in California. If there was no
impact, it could be the case that a±rmative action was either ine®ective in
the ¯rst place in California or that it was e®ective in engendering long-term
changes that remained even after its removal. If there was a negative impact on
the employment of minorities, this suggests that either the prejudicial attitudes
of employers were not changed under California's a±rmative action program or
that the program itself had engendered ine±ciencies and reverse discrimination
against whites.
4Other states and political entities followed suit after the proposal of Proposition 209.
Washington state passed its own repeal of a±rmative action in 1998 although similar proposals
have failed elsewhere.
83 Data
I employ data from the outgoing rotation groups in the monthly Current Popu-
laton Survey (CPS) from 1994-2001, placing emphasis on 1995, the year before
the proposal of Proposition 209, and 1999, two years after the new law had gone
into e®ect. Observations are dropped if an individual is employed but reports no
hours or pay, reports unknown sector of employment, or is self-employed.5 Ob-
servations from Washington state were also dropped because that state passed
legislation similar to Proposition 209 in 1998.
The triple di®erence estimates in this analysis will rely on three divisions of
the data. First, the observations are categorized as before or after the enactment
of proposition 209 (e.g. 1995 or 1999, 1995 or 2000, and so on depending on
the years being used). Second, individuals are divided into eight mutually ex-
clusive and collectively exhaustive categories: white males, white females, black
males, black females, other males, other females, Hispanic males, and Hispanic
females. And third, the country is divided into two groups: an experimental
state (California) and and the remaining control states or \nation."
Table 1 reports sample sizes for each cell. Because of its population, the
sample sizes within California for even this detailed breakdown of minority
groups are still fairly large. However, California is not necessarily representative
of the country as a whole. It is more minority heavy than the rest of the
country and has slightly lower rates of employment, but a similar distribution of
employment across sectors and industry. The fact that California is more diverse
than the country as a whole means that extrapolations from its experience with
a±rmative action to general predictions should be made cautiously.
5Because men are more likely than women to be self-employed, omitting this group tends
to increase the number of women in the sample relative to the number of men
9Average changes in labor force status and wages
Turning to the e®ects of a±rmative action, Table 2 explores the change in
non-participation in the labor force for white females after Proposition 209 was
enacted. In 1995, 46.0 percent of white women in California over age 16 were not
in the labor force while 32.1 percent of white males were not participating. In
1999, after Proposition 209 had gone into e®ect, the percentage of white females
who were not in the labor force had fallen to 44.5 percent, but the participation
of men showed a similar change. Overall, there was no signi¯cant change in
the participation of white women relative to that of white men in California.
As a control, I look at the same outcomes for the rest of the nation. Over the
same period nationwide, the non-participation of white women had fallen by
1.3 percentage points relative to white men. Di®erencing these e®ects, relative
to the rest of the country, non-participation among white females in California
rose by 1.6 more percentage points than that for white males. However, this
estimate is not signi¯cant.
In addition to women, racial minority groups in California may have also
been a®ected by Proposition 209. Table 3 presents triple di®erence average
changes for individual minority groups as well as for all minority groups to-
gether. The outcomes examined are the three labor force categories into which
each individual falls: employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force as well
as the hourly wage. For each group, the triple di®erence is calculated as in the
preceding example. Note in particular that because employment, unemploy-
ment, and non-participation are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive,
the relative changes for each group across these categories sum to 0. The point
estimates indicate that, relative to white males and the rest of the nation, the
proportion of minorities who were employed fell in California, but that there
was little change in unemployment, leaving a rise in non-participation to ac-
count for most of the fall in employment. However, only the estimates for other
10males are signi¯cant. While there is also no signi¯cant change in wages, the
point estimates are positive for six of the seven groups suggesting, for example,
that the relative wage of white females rose by 76 cents. However, there is no
clear prediction about the wage changes that might accompany a policy that
can directly a®ect both wages and employment. It may be the case that the
employees who are left are relatively more skilled, so average wages might rise.
Alternatively, it might be the case that a±rmative action also served to aug-
ment wage equality and so its removal might create a drop in wages. Given the
possibility of opposing e®ects, if is not surprising to ¯nd no signi¯cant impact
on wages.
Individual-speci¯c di®erences
Although it is primarily viewed as a cross-sectional data set, the CPS can also
be used as a panel in which each individual in the outgoing rotation group is
observed twice. To construct a panel, I match the respondents at a particular
address across year and then assume that the respondent is the same person
if sex and race have not changed and if age has increased by 0 to 2 years.
This allows approximately two thirds of the individuals in the outgoing rotation
group in any given year to be matched to the previous year. However, because
of a change in CPS methodology, matching is not possible for June-December
of 1994 and 1995 and January-August of 1995 and 1996.
If Proposition 209 had an e®ect on the labor force status of women and mi-
norities, then one would expect to ¯nd di®erences in the status of individuals
across years. Moreover, by examining the change in outcome for the same indi-
vidual, individual speci¯c ¯xed e®ects (such as ability or skill) are eliminated.
I examine the probability that an individual left the labor force between t = 1
and t = 2 given an observed change in labor force status but constructing an
indicator variable that is 1 if he left the labor force and 0 if he entered the labor
11force. Conditioning on a change in labor force status reduces the sample size,
but creates a binary variable for the ¯rst di®erence, assisting with inference for
the double and triple di®erences.6
Table 4 reports the triple di®erence estimates of the relative probability
that members of each minority group left the labor force given a change in
participation. The ¯rst di®erence is the proportion of each group that left the
labor force conditional on a change in participation. The second di®erence
gives the proportion of each minority group that left the labor force relative
to the proportion of white males. The third di®erence compares this change
in California to the change in the rest of the nation. The estimates indicate
that signi¯cant changes took place between 1994 and 1995 and 1995 and 1996.7
Between 1994 and 1995 in California, white women were 16.7 percent more
likely to have left the labor force given a change in participation than were
white men relative to the nation as a whole. Black males, black females, and
Hispanic females were also more likely to leave the labor force than to enter
to it. Between 1995 and 1996, black women and Hispanic women were again
more likely to leave the labor force than to enter it although the reverse is true
for other females. As a whole, the estimates suggest a signi¯cant climb in the
proportion of minorities who were leaving the labor force relative to entering it
in the mid-nineties.
Note that the years for which these changes are observed are directly pre-
ceding or during the period when Proposition 209 was debated and passed.
This could indicate an anticipation of the change in a±rmative action policy,
6Consider, for instance, the di®erence for an individual in non-participation. It could be
1 (left labor force), 0 (no change), or ¡1 (entered labor force) and so is not binomially or
normally distributed. Because of small sample sizes, it does not seem reasonable to invoke
the Central Limit Theorem and non-parametric tests of di®erences for matched pairs are not
appropriate for double or triple di®erences. By looking at whether an individual entered or left
the labor force conditional on a change in participation, I create a binomial random variable
and avoid these issues.
7These are the same years for which limited matching was possible due to change in CPS
methodology. The signi¯cant estimates are noteworthy given the small sample sizes.
12which seems plausible given the political environment in California at the time.
While these results are indicative of signi¯cant change, they cannot be compared
directly to estimates in upcoming sections which are based on cross sectional
cuts of the data. In particular, the outcome variable in the regressions will not
be conditioned on a change in participation and the span of time examined is
longer than one year. Later results will provide similar evidence of a move out
of the labor force, but this does not seem to be as concentrated in 1994-1995
as suggested here. However, these ¯ndings do bolster later results suggesting a
signi¯cant change in participation.
4 Econometric model
To control further for the characteristics of the potential or actual labor force in
estimating the impacts of Proposition 209, I turn to a triple di®erence regression
framework. For simplicity, consider the case of only one minority treatment
group. In the case of general outcome y, consider the equation
yijt = xijt° + ¯1yeart + ¯2experj + ¯3treati + ¯4(yeart ¤ experj)+
¯5(yeart ¤ treati) + ¯6(experj ¤ treati) + ¯7(yeart ¤ experj ¤ treati) + ²ijt
(1)
where xijt is a vector containing a constant and explanatory variables other
than those that are part of the di®erencing, i indexes an individual, j indexes
location, and t indexes time. In this case, year is a dummy for the latter year in
the regression (e.g. 1999 if we are comparing 1999 to 1995), exper is a dummy
indicating that the individual resides in California, the experimental state, and
treat indicates that the individual is a member of the minority treatment group.
As is standard, the coe±cient ¯7 represents the triple di®erence estimate of the
impact of Proposition 209 on outcome y for the treatment group.
13A quick examination of the various di®erences of interest illustrates this.
Note that the double di®erence estimate of the change in outcome for the treat-
ment group in California relative to white males (wm) can be calculated as
follows:
¢treat;exper = ytreat;exper;99 ¡ ytreat;exper;95 = ¯1 + ¯4 + ¯5 + ¯7 (2)
¢wm;exper = ywm;exper;99 ¡ ywm;exper;95 = ¯1 + ¯4 (3)
¢2
exper = ¢treat;exper ¡ ¢wm;exper = ¯5 + ¯7: (4)
Similarly, the double di®erence for the control states is
¢2
nation = ¢treat;nation ¡ ¢wm;nation = ¯5: (5)
And, so, the triple di®erence estimate of the impact of Proposition 209 is
¢3 = ¢2
exper ¡ ¢2
nation = ¯7: (6)
I estimate a log wage regression to gauge the impact of removing a±rmative
action on hourly wages. Because no likely instrument is present for estimating a
two-stage Heckman-type procedure, this is simply a wage regression conditional
on employment. The possible biases that this may present are discussed along
with the results in the following section.
The remaining three outcomes of interest{ employment, unemployment, and
non-participation{ are binary variables and are commonly estimated with pro-
bit or logit models. As Ai and Norton (2003) point out, the marginal e®ect
of the interacted variables in a nonlinear model is not the same thing as the
marginal e®ect of the interaction term.8 In other words, simply calculating
the marginal e®ect of the triple di®erence term ignores the fact that one can-
8Nevertheless, the authors note that most studies with interaction terms in a nonlinear
model report the marginal e®ect of the interaction term even though there is little intuitive
explanation for what this means. In the di®erences-in-di®erences literature, Gruber (1994),
for example, reports the marginal e®ect of the di®erence-in-di®erence coe±cient.
14not simultaneously \turn o®" ¯7 without a®ecting the other related interaction
variables.
Some authors (e.g., Borjas, 2003) choose to use a linear probability model
to avoid the complications that arise from a nonlinear model with interaction
terms. However, linear probability models have their own (well-known) short-
comings. In this paper, I use a probit model and estimate the triple di®erence
marginal e®ects through repeated di®erencing of the normal CDF. The double
di®erences for the sample of individuals in the treatment group are:
¢2
i;exper =
[©(xi° + ¯1 + ¯2 + ¯3 + ¯4 + ¯5 + ¯6 + ¯7) ¡ ©(xi° + ¯2 + ¯3 + ¯6)] ¡




[©(xi° + ¯1 + ¯3 + ¯5) ¡ ©(xi° + ¯3)] ¡ [©(¹ x° + ¯1) ¡ ©(¹ x°)]; (8)





I average the triple di®erence marginal e®ects across individuals in the treatment
group to get the average marginal e®ect.
The delta method is used to compute standard errors. Again, in previous
work, authors have generally reported only the standard error for ¯7, the triple
di®erence probit coe±cient. But, simply because the estimated probit coe±cient
on the triple di®erence term is signi¯cant does not mean that the marginal e®ect
is. Let h(^ ¯;zi) be the nonlinear function composed of the eight-fold di®erences of
normal CDFs as expressed in Equation 10 and let V¯ be the variance-covariance
15matrix of the coe±cients. Then the variance for the average triple di®erence
marginal e®ect is
V = E(r¯h(¯;xi))V¯E(r¯h(¯;xi))0: (10)


















Note that this method calculates the standard errors for the average triple di®er-
ence marginal e®ect rather than the other commonly used option in evaluating
marginal e®ects: the marginal e®ect for the average member of a group.9
5 Empirical analysis of Proposition 209
Labor force status
Table 5 reports the triple di®erence estimates of the average marginal e®ects
of Proposition 209 on employment, unemployment, and non-participation.10
In reality, the changes in employment, unemployment, and non-participation
must sum to 0, but that added restriction is not placed on the marginal e®ects
reported here. However, for the most part the sum of the unrestricted e®ects
is fairly close to zero. In an attempt to identify possible short and longer term
e®ects of the legislation, three pairs of years are examined: 1995 and 1999, 1995
and 2000, and 1995 and 2001.11 Moreover, the results are presented for each of
9Ai and Norton (2003) provide an estimator for the variance of the marginal e®ect for
the average individual when using interaction terms, but not for the average marginal e®ect.
Thanks to Stephen Donald for his help with obtaining the correct estimator for the case used
here.
10In addition to race and sex, age, marital status, interview month, education, region, urban
status, citizenship, and nativity were also controlled for in all regressions. Wage regressions
also included indicators of sector of employment (public, private, or federal), occupation, and
industry.
11In all cases, 1995 is used as the base year to which post-legislation years are compared.
The results are similar if 1993, 1994, or 1996 is used as the base instead. In addition, 1998
and 2002-2003 were also examined as post-legislation years. The triple di®erence coe±cients
are smaller in 1998, similar in 2002, and become insigni¯cant in 2003. However, it is not clear
how to interpret this since extending the time frame also increases the chance of unobserved
events biasing the results.
16the seven treatment groups as well as for all of the minorities together.
Looking at the results presented in Table 5, between 1995 and 1999 the rela-
tive employment of minorities fell by 2.8 percentage points while non-participation
rose by 2.9 percentage points. Similarly, between 1995 and 2000 relative em-
ployment fell by 1.8 percentage points (but the change is not signi¯cant) and
non-participation rose by 2.2 percentage points, and between 1995 and 2001
relative employment fell by 2.2 percentage points while non-participation rose
by 2.0 percentage points. Breaking this down by group, between 1995 and 1999,
relative non-participation rose by 2.9 percentage points for white females, 4.6
percentage points for black females, 1.4 percentage points for Hispanic males,
5.2 percentage points for Hispanic females, and 6.8 percentage points for other
males. This increase in non-participation accounts for nearly all of the decline
in employment for all groups except black females, who also saw a drop in un-
employment. Only black males and other females do not exhibit signi¯cant
changes in labor force status between 1995 and 1999. By 2001, however, there
appears to have been a rise in non-participation for all minority groups except
for black men, who show a signi¯cant fall in non-participation.12
As a whole, the results suggest that the impact of Proposition 209 was to
move females and minorities from employment to out of the labor force. If,
as the results indicate, the removal of a±rmative action made it more di±cult
for women and minorities to ¯nd work, then this exit from the labor force is
not surprising. Previous work has tended to indicate that women have more
12Interestingly, these estimates are nearly identical to those obtained using a linear probabil-
ity model with robust standard errors, which avoids the complications inherent in estimating
the marginal e®ects and their standard errors and makes it simple to restrict them to sum
to zero. However, the estimates presented here are of much smaller magnitude than those
obtained if the marginal e®ect of the interaction term is used instead. For instance, the av-
erage marginal e®ect of the triple di®erence coe±cient{ that is, the di®erence of the normal
CDF with ¯7 turned \on" and \o®"{ suggests that between 1995 and 1999, employment for
all minorities fell by 10 percentage points, unemployment rose by 2.4 percentage points, and
non-participation rose by 11.2 percentage points. That these e®ects are so much larger than
those obtained using the correct method is somewhat alarming given the frequency with which
marginal e®ects are calculated in this way.
17elastic labor supplies than men and that they tend to be more responsive along
the extensive participation margin (Blau and Kahn, 2005). In addition, when
looking at the impact of minimum wage legislation, Mincer (1976) ¯nds that
a®ected groups tend to leave the labor force and, moreover, that females and
minorities have relatively high participation elasticities.
Wages
As discussed previously, there is no clear prediction of the impact of removing
a±rmative action on wages. Relative wage changes will depend on the nature
of pre-existing discrimination, the e®ectiveness of a±rmative action, and the
relative skill levels of the groups a®ected by its removal. It is thus not surprising
that the results in Table 6 do not show such clear patterns as the labor force
status results. No signi¯cant changes are observed between 1995 and 1999 with
the exception of the relative wages of employed Hispanic females, which have
risen by 5 percent. In 2000 we see a rise for other females, but the wages for black
males have fallen by 9.2 percent. Between 1995 and 2001, only black females
show a signi¯cant change in relative wages. As a whole, the results do not show
a consistent e®ect for any of the groups. This could indicate that a±rmative
action had little e®ect on wages. A±rmative action laws, after all, did not
directly address wage equality, which was covered by equal employment law.
It could also be the result of skill selection among those leaving employment.
Since the wage regressions are conditional on employment, the wages of those
who remain employed could rise because they are relatively more skilled or fall
because they are relatively less skilled than those who left.
Participation e®ects by age and education level
The wage ¯ndings do not provide consistent evidence of skill bias among those
who remain employed, but they do not prove the contrary either. Previous stud-
ies have suggested that a±rmative action helps to advance minorities into more
18skilled occupations (e.g., Goldstein and Smith, 1976; Leonard, 1984b). However,
it is not clear how the removal of a±rmative action would a®ect workers across
skill groups. It could be the case that low-skilled workers become discouraged
with the diminishment of opportunities for advancement and leave the labor
force or, perhaps, it might directly impact those high-skilled workers who had
previously advanced. In an attempt to gauge if a particular group is dispropor-
tionately a®ected by the legislation, the non-participation marginal e®ects were
estimated for separate segments of the sample.
Table 7 reports these results. In columns (1)-(3), non-participation marginal
e®ects are reported for three education levels: less than high school, a high school
diploma, and education beyond high school.13 On average, non-participation
rose more for minorities with lower levels of education. For those with less than
a high school degree, non-participation rose by 3.5 percentage points, for those
with a high school degree or education beyond high school, the corresponding
rises were 2.8 and 2.5 percentage points, respectively. This trend is evident for
the disaggregated treatment groups as well, although, as in the earlier results,
the rise tends only to be signi¯cant for white females, black females, hispanic
females, and other males. Turning to age, columns (4)-(6) report results for
three age brackets: 30 years old or younger, 30 to 50 years old, and older than
50. On average, non-participation rose more for the youngest group of workers
than for older ones. When disaggregated by treatment group, for all groups
except Hispanics it seems that non-participation rose more for individuals who
are under 30 years old or over 50. This is not surprising given the expectation
that very young and very old workers will be less attached to the labor force
than middle aged workers. If education and age truly proxy for skill, then
these ¯ndings suggest that the removal of a±rmative action disproportionately
13These estimates are based on the NILF probit for the entire sample, but the marginal
e®ects are calculated for the relevant level of education or age.
19a®ected low-skilled workers.
Sector of employment
Previously I suggested that, because Proposition 209 does not supersede federal
a±rmative action laws, workers in California's public sector, who were covered
by California policy but not federal, might see the largest e®ects from the mea-
sure. However, it is di±cult to use CPS data to compare inter-sector di®erences.
The results for the economy as a whole suggest that Proposition 209 did not
a®ect the unemployment rate but did decrease participation. But, if an individ-
ual is not in the labor force, then we cannot identify what sector they may have
worked in previously. I attempt to circumvent this problem by using a probit
model to estimate the impact of Proposition 209 on the probability that an in-
dividual works in the private, public (state or local), or federal sector given that
he is employed. Because some of the cell sample sizes become very small when
disaggregated by both treatment group and sector, the estimation is performed
only for all minorities as a single treatment group.
Table 8 presents these results. The point estimates suggest that minorities
were actually slightly more likely to work in the public sector and less likely
to work in the private sector after the removal of a±rmative action. This is
counter to the expectation that the negative e®ects of Proposition 209 would
be strongest for state and local workers in California. It may be the case that
private employers did respond to the removal of state-sponsored a±rmative
action in California and to the general anti-a±rmative action climate of the
period. While many private-sector ¯rms in California were likely to be federal
contractors, federal a±rmative action policy had also been under intense legal
scrutiny during the nineties and private employers in California may have felt
more bound by state policy than federal. However, the coe±cients here are
insigni¯cant and of small magnitude, thus providing no strong evidence of a
20signi¯cant shift between sectors of employment.
6 Conclusion
The enactment of Proposition 209 in California created a unique opportunity
to study the labor market e®ects of the removal of a±rmative action programs.
Changes in minority outcomes in California relative to those of white males are
compared to the same di®erences for the rest of the nation in order to separate
the e®ects of Proposition 209 from general trends in inequality.
The results suggest that there was a sharp drop in employment after the
passage of Proposition 209, which resulted in minorities leaving the labor force.
Between 1995 and 1999, relative employment for minorities in California fell
by 2.8 percentage points as these groups left the labor force, causing non-
participation rates to climb by a corresponding 2.9 percentage points. Dis-
aggregated, non-participation rates in California rose by 2.9 percentage points
for white women, 4.6 percentage points for black women, 5.2 percentage points
for Hispanic women, 1.4 percentage points for Hispanic men, and 6.8 percentage
points for other men. There appears to have been little corresponding change in
wages rates, but this may be driven by skill bias in the workers who remained
employed in later years.
The decline in minority participation raises doubts about a±rmative action
programs. It is consistent with one of two hypotheses: that a±rmative action is
ine±cient and creates reverse discrimination or that a±rmative action is inef-
fective at engendering permanent change in prejudices that create labor market
inequality. A ¯nal possibility is that California's a±rmative action programs
had not been in place long enough to engender permanent alteration in inequal-
ity. However, given that California had pursued a±rmative action for over a
generation, this may be equally discouraging.
21Table 1: Sample Sizes
1995 1999
Nation California Nation California
white male 94;335 5;113 84;120 5;191
white female 112;672 6;045 98;649 5;927
black male 11;582 595 10;238 597
black female 16;689 773 14;409 812
hispanic male 7;301 2;805 8;315 2;992
hispanic female 8;533 3;144 8;991 3;168
other male 4;857 1;310 4;431 1;246
other female 5;758 1;500 5;198 1;486
total 261;727 21;285 234;351 21;419




1995 1999 for Group
California
white females 0.460 0.445 -0.015
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
white males 0.321 0.302 -0.018
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009)





white females 0.432 0.421 -0.012
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
white males 0.284 0.285 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)






*Standard errors are in parentheses below estimates. All di®erences in bold
are signi¯cant at the 5% level. Rounding is done after calculations.
23Table 3: Triple Di®erences Summary, 1995-1999
Not in Hourly
Employed Unemployed Labor Force Wage
white males - - - -
white females -0.021 0.005 0.016 0.761
black males -0.054 0.008 0.047 -0.240
black females -0.034 -0.019 0.053 0.256
hispanic males -0.002 -0.010 0.012 0.185
hispanic females -0.029 -0.004 0.033 0.504
other males -0.060 0.003 0.057 0.028
other females -0.016 0.002 0.014 0.765
all minorities -0.017 -0.003 0.020 0.012
*Values in bold are signi¯cant at the 5% level. All monetary values are in 1995
dollars.
Table 4: Triple di®erences for proportion of each group that left the
labor force conditional on a change in participation
93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99
white males - - - - - -
white females 0.015 0.167 0.155 0.017 -0.007 0.038
black males -0.039 0.477 0.251 0.010 0.019 -0.013
black females -0.156 0.289 0.318 -0.061 0.052 0.075
hispanic males -0.017 0.177 -0.072 -0.018 -0.041 -0.033
hispanic females -0.036 0.186 0.235 -0.009 -0.010 -0.040
other males 0.015 0.068 0.100 0.046 -0.127 0.006
other females -0.054 0.155 -0.276 0.048 -0.022 -0.032
all minorities -0.038 0.157 0.116 -0.008 -0.034 -0.022
*Values in bold are signi¯cant at the 10% level.
24Table 5: Triple Di®erence Marginal E®ects for Employment, Unem-
ployment, and Non-Participation Probits
1995-1999 1995-2000 1995-2001
coef se coef se coef se
Employment
white females -0.034 0.011 -0.018 0.011 -0.026 0.011
black males -0.035 0.027 -0.012 0.027 0.027 0.027
black females -0.029 0.024 -0.054 0.024 -0.051 0.024
hispanic males -0.008 0.016 -0.030 0.016 -0.034 0.016
hispanic females -0.048 0.017 -0.045 0.017 -0.034 0.017
other males -0.071 0.020 -0.047 0.020 -0.068 0.001
other females -0.020 0.020 -0.022 0.020 -0.028 0.020
all minorities -0.028 0.010 -0.018 0.010 -0.022 0.010
Unemployment
white females 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004
black males 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.002 0.014
black females -0.016 0.011 -0.022 0.010 0.002 0.012
hispanic males -0.003 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.008
hispanic females -0.003 0.007 0.005 0.007 <0.001 0.008
other males 0.005 0.009 -0.009 0.008 0.010 0.009
other females <0.001 0.007 <0.001 0.006 0.008 0.007
all minorities <0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005
Non-
participation
white females 0.029 0.010 0.018 0.010 0.022 0.011
black males 0.029 0.026 0.002 0.026 -0.024 0.026
black females 0.046 0.023 0.079 0.024 0.050 0.024
hispanic males 0.014 0.015 0.029 0.015 0.032 0.015
hispanic females 0.052 0.017 0.041 0.016 0.036 0.016
other males 0.068 0.020 0.059 0.019 0.059 0.019
other females 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.019
all minorities 0.029 0.009 0.022 0.009 0.020 0.010
*Marginal e®ects are averages across the relevant treatment group. Marginal
e®ects and standard errors are calculated as outlined in the text. Values in
bold are signi¯cant at the 5% level.
25Table 6: Triple Di®erence Coe±cients for Log(Wage) Regressions
1995-1999 1995-2000 1995-2001
coef se coef se coef se
white females 0.001 0.018 -0.014 0.019 -0.003 0.020
black males -0.039 0.039 -0.092 0.040 -0.005 0.040
black females -0.029 0.040 -0.029 0.037 -0.100 0.041
hispanic males 0.007 0.021 0.005 0.021 -0.019 0.021
hispanic females 0.052 0.024 0.044 0.023 0.037 0.025
other males -0.016 0.033 0.044 0.031 0.009 0.033
other females 0.041 0.030 0.087 0.029 0.019 0.032
all minorities 0.010 0.015 0.008 0.015 -0.002 0.016
*Standard errors are robust. Values in bold are signi¯cant at the 5% level.
All monetary values are 1995 dollars.
Table 7: Triple Di®erence Marginal E®ects by Education and Age for
Non-Participation Probit, 1995-1999
Education Age
High High High <
School School
>
School <30 30-50 > 50
white females 0.032 0.030 0.027 0.036 0.026 0.028
black males 0.032 0.031 0.027 0.035 0.026 0.030
black females 0.049 0.048 0.045 0.056 0.041 0.046
hispanic males 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.010
hispanic females 0.057 0.050 0.045 0.058 0.052 0.043
other males 0.083 0.072 0.062 0.080 0.060 0.067
other females 0.025 0.021 0.017 0.023 0.016 0.022
all minorities 0.035 0.028 0.025 0.035 0.028 0.025
*Marginal e®ects are averages across the relevant treatment group and are calculated
as outlined in the text. Values in bold are signi¯cant at the 5% level.
Table 8: Triple Di®erence Marginal E®ects for Sector of Employment
Probits for all Minorities, 1995-1999
coef se p-value
P(PrivatejEmp) -0.0011 0.0006 0.0805
P(Public jEmp) 0.0012 0.0008 0.1423
P(FederaljEmp) -0.0001 <0.0001 0.1206
*Marginal e®ects are averages across the relevant treatment
group and are calculated as outlined in the text. Values in
bold are signi¯cant at the 5% level.
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